The Welfare Cost of Distortions in the United States Tax System: A General Equilibrium Approach by Charles L. Ballard et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE WELFARE COST OF DISTORTIONS IN THE





Working Paper No. 1043




This paper waspresentedat the Third Latin American Meeting of the
Econometric Society, Mexico City, July 19—22, 1982, and at the
National Bureau of Economic Research, August 11 and 17, 1982. We
wish to thank Don Fullerton, Joel Slemrod, and Charles Stuart for
helpful comments. The research reported here is part of the NBER's
research program in Taxation. Any opinions expressed are those of
the authors and not those of the National Bureau of Economic
Research.NBER Working Paper #1043
December 1982
Abstract
THEWELFARE COSTOF DISTORTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATESTAXSYSTEM:A GENERAL
- EQUILIBRIUMAPPROACH
Usinga general equilibrium model of the United States economy,
we examine the combined welfare cost of all taxes in the U.S. revenue system.
We find that the welfare losses caused by distortionary taxation can bevery
large, both on average and at the margin.
The marginal welfare loss to consumers from raising an additional
dollar of revenue is in the range of 34 cents to 48 cents, depending on certain
elasticities. This has very important implications for cost—benefit analysis.
If a public project must be financed by distortionary taxes which cause dead-
weight loss, this excess burden must be taken into account when we decide
whether to undertake the project. Our calculations indicate that the marginal
deadweight loss is between one—third and one—half of marginal revenues. This
large wedge could cause us to approve many fewer projects than we would approve
if we were to use the simple condition that the sum of the marginal rates of
substitution should equal the marginal rate of transformation.
The average deadweight loss per dollar of revenue is smaller than the
marginal deadweight loss, but it is still substantial. We estimate that the
present value of the gain from replacing the distortionary tax system with
certain lump sum taxes would be in the range of $1.8 trillion to $3.1 trillion,
or 13 cents to 22 cents per dollar of revenue. The gains would be about 60
percent as great if the existing system were replaced with a proportional income
tax. Replacing the existing system with a consumption—type value—added tax would
give even greater gains than those from switching to a proportional income tax.
Charles Ballard John B. Shoven John Whalley
Department of Economics Department of Economics Department of Economics
Stanford University Stanford University Univ. of Western Ontario
Stanford, CA 94305 Stanford, CA 94305 London, Ontario
(415) 497—3273 Canada N6A 5C2
(519) 679—3973THE WELFARECOST OF DISTORTIONS IN THE
UNITEDSTATES TAXSYSTEM:A GENERAL
EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH
'Every tax ought to be so contrived as both to take out and keep
out of the pockets of the people as little as possible over and
above what it brings into the public treasury of the state."
Adam Smith —TheWealth of Nations
Book V, Ch. II.
I.Introduction
In his famous 1776 publication, Adam Smith examined the possibility
that the private cpsts of government revenue are substantiallygreater than
the tax proceeds. He attributed this excess private burden to compliance
costs, the distortion of economic activity, and administrative overhead.
In this paper, we make a numerical assessment of the second of these costs.
In the past, estimates of the efficiency costs of taxation have concentrated
on particular aspects of the tax code. Here, we examine the combined welfare
cost of all taxes in the United States.
We present two main sets of results. The first set includes calcula-
tions of the marginal excess burden of distortionary taxes. When the
government collects an additional dollar of revenue, the cost to the private
sector exceeds a dollar by the marginal excess burden. This has obvious
implications for cost—benefit analysis. The greater the marginal excess
burden, the fewer' will be the number of public projects which society ought
to approve. We find that the marginal excess burden is quite substantial.
The welfare loss from a one percent increase in all distortionary tax rates
is in the range of 34 cents to 48 cents per dollar of extra revenue, depending
on certain elasticity assumptions. This means that a public project which
- 12
requires a dollar of tax revenue must produce benefits of more than
$1.34. We also calculate the marginal excess burden from increases
in various parts of the tax system. Capital taxes (such as corporate
and property taxes) and personal income taxes have large marginal excess
burdens, while labor taxes (such as the Social Security payroll tax) are
less distortionary.
The second set of results includes calculations of the average
welfare gain from replacing all or part of the distortionary tax system
with some alternative tax. If all distortionary taxes were replaced with
a set of lump sum levies, the present value of the welfare gain is in the
range of $1.78 trillion to $3.11 trillion, in 1973dollars,1' 2 depending
on our elasticity values. The annual value of these efficiency costs is
from 13 to 22 percent of revenues raised. Thus, average welfare costs are
roughly one—half of marginal costs. We also consider replacement of different
parts of the tax system with lump sum taxes. Once again, the most distorionary
taxes are those which fall on capital and personal income, while the labor
3
taxes are iess cistortionary.
Obviously, replacing the existing tax system with lump sum taxes is
not a realistic policy option. However, we have also experimented with
replacing the existing tax system with broadly based but still distortionary
taxes. If the only tax were a progressive income tax, more than one—fourth
of the welfare loss could be eliminated. If the only tax were a proportional
income tax, about three—fifths could be eliminated.4
Our calculations suggest that the economic efficiency of the tax
system is very important. If the welfare costs of distortionary taxes are
this large, then it is difficult to accept the view that microeconomic issues3
are of secondary importance compared to macroeconomic ones. Our results
indicate that Harberger triangles may not be nearly as small as Harberger
(1964) himself believed them to be. Moreover, as taxes are increased, the
deadweight loss triangles grow roughly 34 to 48 percent as much as the
revenue rectangles.
In Section II, we discuss some conceptual issues in the evaluation
of the welfare cost of tax distortions. In Section III, we discuss the
types of distortion generated by various U.S. taxes, and we describe our
general equilibrium model. We give special attention to the specification
of those elasticity parameters which are of central importance to our results.
Wepresentour results in Section IV.SectionV is a brief concluding section.4
II. Evaluating the Cost of Distortions
The marginal cost of distortionary taxes can be examined with a
simple partial equilibrium model. Consider the case of a single good
with a downward—sloping compensated demand function an4 a perfectly
elastic supply function, as shown in Figure 1. A proportional tax at rate
t shifts the supply function from P to P(l+t) and this, in turn, reduces
the quantity consumed.
The welfare loss to the economy from such a tax in partial equilibrium
terms is given by the consumer surplus triangle, ABC. If we assume that the
demand curve is linear, as we have done in Figure 1, the well—known formula
for the welfare loss, L, is:
(1) L =-- cpqt2,
where c is the compensated price elasticity of demand, and p and q are the
initial price and quantity.5 As a first approximation, the revenue raised,





This average welfare loss is simply the ratio of the area of triangle ABC
to rectangle BCGF in Figure 1.
The marginal welfare cost when taxes are raised from t to t' is the
ratio of the increase in the triangle to the additional revenue raised.
Inspection of the figure reveals that, to a close approximation, the
incremental excess burden is proportional to the tax rate, t.If we
differentiate equation (1) with respect to t, we findPric
p (l+t'
5
Figure 1——Simple Partial Equilibrium Evaluation of Welfare











The results summarized in the Introduction correspond with this
simple partial equilibrium analysis. Comparing equations (2) and (4), we
see that the average loss is half the marginal loss. This accords roughly
with our range of marginal excess burden from 34 cents to 48 cents and of
average excess burden from 13 cents to 22 cents. More importantly, our
marginal loss figuresseem consistent with the simple partial equilibrium
analysis above. We should recognize that the t in equation (4) is the tax
rate as a proportion of net expenditure. This means that, for the economy
as a whole, the correct figure for t may be around 0.6 ormore.6 It is
difficult to reduce all of the different elasticities to a single elasticity
figure for the entire economy. If we could do so, it seems likely that the
correct figure would be between 0.5 and 1.0. Multiplying these figures
together, as in equation (4), would give us a figure for marginal excess
burden in the same region in which our actual calculations lie.
We do notmean to suggest that the only standard for judging our
results is their consonance with partial equilibrium results. The general
equilibrium approach has many advantages. It enables us to consider simul—
taneouslymany tax changes in many sectors and it does not rely on local
approximations. Still, we find it encouraging that a simple partial
equilibriumanalysis lends support to our conclusion that welfare costs can
bevery large, both on average and on the margin.7
Our actual welfare calculations are more complicated than those
suggested by equation (1), for two reasons. First, we have a large model
with many different goods and tax rates which vary widely. It can be
shown that efficiency loss estimates increase with additional disaggregation
(see Fullerton, Henderson, Shoven [1983)). Further, in this paper we find
that the variance in tax rates adds substantially to the deadweight losses.
Second, we consider the economy's evolution over time explicitly, by calcu-
lating a sequence of equilibria. We have 12 consumer groups, and for each
of them we compute a sequence of values for consumption, leisure, and saving
in each period, both in the presence and absence of the tax change. We
calculate each consumer's utility in each period from current consumption
and leisure. Then we take the present value of these utilities, for the
before—change sequence and the after—change sequence. For each consumer,
we compute the financial transfer necessary to equate the present values
in the absence and presence of the tax change. The sum of these figures
across the 12 households is our measure of the dynamic welfare change. This
calculation is in the spirit of the static Hicksian equivalent variation.8
III. A General Equilibrium Model of the
U.S. Economy and Tax System: Structure
and Data
To keep the focus of this paper on results and policy implications,
only a brief overview of model structure is given here. We provide a very
detailed description of our model in Chapters 3—7 of Ballard, Fullerton,
Shoven, and Whalley (1983).
First, we summarize he production side of the model. In any single
period, there are 19 producer good industries that use capital and labor in
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) value—added functions. They also
use the outputs of other industries through a matrix of fixed input—output
coefficients. Tax rates on labor for each industry are derived by taking
payroll taxes and other contributions as a proportion of labor income, while
tax rates on capital for each industry are derived by taking corporate income,
corporate franchise, and property taxes as a proportion of capital income.
Each of these 19 producer goods is used directly for investment, for net
exports, and by the government. The transformation of producer goods into
consumer goods is represented by a matrix of fixed coefficients. This
procedure is necessary because the goods classification of consumer expenditure
data is different from the classification of the outputs of the 19 production
sectors.
On the consumer side of the model, we have 12 consumer groups, which
are distinguished by their money income7 in 1973 (the basic data year forthe
model).Each consumer group has an initial endowment of capital and labor.
Consumer decisions regarding factor supplies are made jointly with their
consumption decisions. Each household at any point in time has a nested
CES utility function of the form:9
(5) U = X,
CJ
where H is the instantaneous utility function defined over current consumption
commodities X. and leisure 9, and the function U determines the allocation
between current welfare and expected future consumption, Cf. Current consumption
commodities X. are aggregated using a Cobb—Douglas function, whereas both U
and H are CES functions.
Most of the simulations reported here employ the assumption of myopic
expectations. Because of this assumption, the current rate of return and other
current prices are all that we require to formulate a budget in terms of prices
for present and future consumption. With myopic expectations, the expected
price of future consumption depends inversely on the current rate of return,
which consumers expect will obtain in all future periods. When U is maximized
subject to a budget constraint, we get a desired level of Cf for each consumer.
The demand for Cf is then translated into a demand for saving in the current
period. The latter is, in turn, translated into a vector of investment demands
for the 19 industry outputs.
The myopic expectations assumption stands at one extreme along a
spectrum of possible assumptions regarding consumer beliefs about future
prices. At the other extreme is the assumption of perfect foresight, under
which consumer beliefs about the future turn out to be correct. Ballard and
Goulder (1982) have investigated the sensitivity of our model's results to
different assumptions about expectations. They define the number of years
of foresight as the number of years into the future over which consumers have
correct beliefs. When the number of years of foresight is zero, consumers
have myopic beliefs. In the limit, as the number of years of foresight grows10
large, we approach perfect foresight. In this paper, we use the algorithm
developed by Ballard and Goulder to study the sensitivity of our results
to the number of years of foresight. We find that our results are fairly
robust with respect to the assumptions on consumer beliefs about future
prices. Therefore, most of our calculations are of myopic sequences of
equilibria, since these are less expensive to compute.
Government collects taxes from both the production and demand sides
of the economy and uses the revenue in a balanced budget. The government
purchases producer goods via a Cobb—Douglas utility function, makes direct
transfer payments to consumers, and subsidizes government enterprises. A
simple trade sector closes the model.
We specify our model with data from 1973 because this is the most
recent year during which the Department of Labor conducted a Consumer
Expenditure Survey. In addition to this survey, we use four other major
data sources. These are the July, 1976, Survey of Current Business, the
Bureau of Economic Analysis Input—Output Matrix, unpublished worksheets of
the U.S. Department of Commerce National Income Division, and the U.S.
Treasury Department's Merged Tax File. In order to use all of these data
together, adjustments are made to ensure that each part is consistent with
the rest. All data on industry and government uses of factors are accepted
as given, while the data on consumer factor incomes and expenditures are
correspondingly adjusted. Tax receipts, transfers, and government endowments
are accepted as given, and government expenditures are adjusted in order to
yield a balanced budget. Similar adjustments ensure that supply equals demand
for all goods and factors, and that trade is balanced.11
The fully consistent data set defines a single period benchmark
equilibrium in terms of transactions. These observations on values are
separated into prices and quantities by assuming that a physical unit of
a good or factor is the amount that sells for one dollar. All benchmark
equilibrium prices are $1, and observed values are the benchmark quantities.
The equilibrium conditions of the model are then used to determine
the behavioral equation parameters, consistent with the benchmark data set.
This procedure calibrates the model to the benchmark data, in the sense
that the benchmark data can be reproduced as an equilibrium solution to the
model before any policy changes are considered. In order to implement this
procedure, we specify the elasticities of substitution between capital and
labor in each industry, on the basis of the econometric literature. We also
specify labor supply and saving elasticities, to which substitution elasticities
in preferences are calibrated. Factor employments by industry are used to
derive production function weights, and expenditure data are used to derive
utility function weights. This calibration procedure allows for a test of
the solution and ensures that the various agents' behaviors are mutually
consistent in our benchmark data before we evaluate policy changes.
The elasticities of labor supply and saving are important for our
results, so it is appropriate to discuss our choices. There are a large
number of estimates for the uncompensated elasticity of labor supply with
respect to the real, net—of—tax wage. Elasticity estimates formales are
mostlysmall and negative, ranging from —0.40 to zero. Borjas and Heckman
(1978) review these econometric studies and reduce the bounds to —0.19 and
—0.07. The estimates for females are more often positive, and can be large
in absolute value. Killingsworth (1982) finds that the elasticity estimates
for females are mostly between 0.20 and 0.90 in cross—section studies.12
We choose a value of 0.15 for each of our consumer groups, which we
take as a weighted average of plausible estimates for males and females.
We use this value to select the elasticity of substitution between present
consumption and present leisure for the "H" function in equation (5) for
each consumer. To test the sensitivity of the model, we also use a zero
uncompensated labor supply elasticity.
As we pointed out in Section II, the coinpenstated elasticities are
the really important elasticities, from the point of view of our welfare
cost calculations. Even though we specify the labor supply decision in our
model on the basis of an uncompensated elasticity, we still can compute the
implied compensated elasticities. The basic theory of consumer behavior,
from which the econometric literature on labor supply derives, implies that
the compensated labor supply elasticity should exceed the uncompensated
elasticity (i.e., the income effect discourages work). This is borne out

















































The other key parameter is the elasticity of saving withrespect
to the real, after—tax rate of return. We use the value of thiselasticity
to choose values for the elasticity of substitution betweenpresent consumption,
H, and future consumPtion-Cf, f or each consumer.
There is considerable controversy in the econometric literature
regarding the value of the uncompensated saving elasticity. For a long time,
the consensus appeared to favor a zero value for this elasticity. This
proposition was termed Denison's Law, after Denison (1958). In more recent
work, Boskin (1978) has estimated this elasticity to be approximately 0.3 to
0.4. On the other hand, Summers (1981) derives savings elasticities between
1.5 and 3.0, by manipulating the parameters of a life cycle model. Each of
these studies has problems of technique and interpretation. Inparticular,
for reasons outlined in the paper by Starrett (1982), Summers'selasticity figures
may be high. We report simulations using the values of 0.0 and 0.4 for the
saving elasticity. As is to be expected, the average and marginal excess
burdens increase as the saving elasticity increases. If the elasticitywere
in the range suggested by Sunmiers, the welfare gains from reinvoing all
distortions would be more than twice as great as those reported here.
Another important parameter is the steady—state growth rate of the
benchmark equilibrium sequence. To derive this rate, wecompare the amount
of observed 1973 saving to the capital stock. This gives us a rate ofgrowth
of capital, which is 2.89 percent per year. We then assume that the number
of effective units of labor grows at the same rate. Though labor endowments
grow at this fixed annual rate in both the benchmark sequence and the revised
sequence, the demand for leisure is endogenous, which implies that actual
labor supply may differ. Though the capital stock grows at this rate in the14
benchmark sequence, endogenous savingimplies that capital in the revised
case may grow at a different rate.
The 2.89 percent labor growth rate isassumed to be equally divided
between Harrod—neutral technical change andpopulation growth. Our welfare
measures of tax changes are adjusted to accountonly for the initial
population. If total population were included in thewelfare calculations,
the importance of future periods would besensitive to population growth.
A final important parameter is the realnet—of—tax return to capital
in the benchmark data. Since this value is usedto calibrate preference
parameters under the assumption of intertemporalutility maximization, it
also determines the rate of time preference in thebenchmark sequence of
equilibria. We use four percent for theaverage value of this parameter,
but each income class receives a net—of—taxreturn that depends on its own
marginal tax rate.
In Table 2, we present a summary of theway in which we model the
effects of the various taxes. On the basis of thismodeling, we calculate
tax rates. Table 3 includes somesummary information about these tax rates.
The figures in Table 3 suggest that capitaltaxes should be candidates for
being major sources of welfare cost. Defining capitaltax rates as a
proportion of net income (such that some rates exceedunity), we find that
the average tax rate on capital at theindustry level is about 0.97. (Note
that we do not incorporate the reduction incapital tax rates which was part
of the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act. Fora study of the effects of these
changes, see Fullerton and Henderson 11981].)
In contrast to capital taxes, labor taxes (SocialSecurity and other








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Marginal income tax rates are high, on average. In addition, the
income tax rates differ substantially among consumers. In our model, each
of the 12 consumer groups faces a linear income tax schedule. The rates
rise from 0.01 for the poorest group to 0.41 for the richest.
Consumer sales and excise tax rates average about 6.7 percent, and
the rates for most goods are reasonably low. However, there are three
notable exceptions. The tax rate on alcoholic beverages is 0.875, on
tobacco,: 0.958, and on gasoline and other fuels, 0.295.
-
Thekey distortions created by the income tax deal with factor supplies.
It is widely recognized that the income tax distorts labor supply decisions.
In addition, the supply of new capital through saving is affected by the
"double taxation" of saving. Double taxation i mitigated partially by tax
shelters (such as Individual Retirement Accounts). We model the U.S. tax system
of 1973 by assuming that 30 percent of saving is sheltered in this way.
Another aspect of the effect of the income tax on factor supplies is
the fact that consumers with higher incomes face higher marginal tax rates.
Since saving is heavily concentrated in the top tail of the income distribution,
much of the saving in the economy occurs where the tax rates are highest.8
On the other hand, labor supply is much more widely diffused. Consequently,
the effective rates of tax on labor income are lower, on average, than those
facing capital income.
In addition to factor supply decisions, the income tax also has
important features which distort choices among industries and commodities.
The most prominent of these is the preferential treatment of housing which
results from the absence of tax on the imputed income of owner—occupied
housing. This is compounded by preferential treatment for capital gains on18
houses. These features of the tax law combine to create substantial static
resource allocation and interteinporal distortions.
In modeling the corporate tax, we follow In the tradition of Harberger
(1962, 1966) who treats it as a partial factor tax. More recently, this
treatment has been the subject of active debate. It has been argued that the
corporate tax acts as a tax on the return to equity, rather than on the total
return to capital invested in the corporation. Stiglitz (1973) has argued
further that if all marginal investments by firms are debt financed, the
corporate tax operates as a lump sum tax. However, so many features of corporate
financial behavior remain unexplained that we follow Harberger's procedure of
treating the corporate tax as an ad valorein tax on capital, with average and
marginal rates the same. Thus the corporate tax misallocates capital services
among industries in the economy, since tax rates differ by industry. In
addition, the tax affects saving decisions, since savers who acquire corporate
equity have to pay a higher tax rate on the return to their savings than they
would pay in the absence of the tax. Further distortions operate through the
treatment of depreciation in the corporate tax. On the other hand, depreciation
allowances can be taken at rates which are faster than the true depreciation
of assets. On the other hand, depreciation is calculated on a historical cost
basis. Capital tax rates also include the investment tax credit. All these
features combine to produce a pattern of tax rates by industry which is
significantly discriminatory.
Similarly to the corporate tax, we treat the property tax as a
differential tax on capital by sector. This falls most heavily on residential
housing, but structures in other capital—using industries in the economy are
also liable for the tax. As with the corporate income tax, both static and
dynamic distortions occur.19
Consumer sales taxes have a variety of effects.Even if the sales
tax system covers all commoditiesevenly, it still distorts labor supply
decisions. Additional distortionscome from the nontaxatjon of food and
other exempted items. The specific exciseson alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline
are sharply discriminatory in our model, sincewe treat them (along with sales
taxes) as ad valorein taxes. However, werecognize that this treatment could
be challenged. The taxes on alcohol andtobacco could be defended as externality
correcting, and the gasoline tax defended as a benefit—related feefor the use
of the highway system.
The last major component of the taxsystem consists of payroll taxes
for Social Security, unemployment insurancetaxes, and workmen's compensation
taxes. We treat these as advalorem taxeson labor at the industry level,
rather than as benefit—related charges, because thecorrespondence between
taxes and benefits for any individual isvery rough.
In our discussion of the various types oftaxes, we have repeatedly
distinguished intertemporal distortions (which affectsaving decisions) from
intersectoral distortions (which affect choicesamong industries or consumer
goods). Many of the general equilibrium models whichexist today can calculate
only a single equilibrium. Consequently, they arepoorly equipped to analyze
the relative importance of intertemporal andintersectoral distortions. Our
model calculates a sequence of equilibria,covering an arbitrarily long period
of time. The equilibria are tied togetherby endogenous saving decisions and
exogenous growth of labor endowments. This allows us toassess intertemporal
distortions as well as intersectoral ones.
Through their interaction, utility—maximizing consumers andprofit—
maximizing producers are assumed to reach a single periodcompetitive equilibrium20
where all profits are zero and supply equals demand for each good and
factor. Starting with data on endowments, tax rates, preferences, and
production parameters, we use Merrill's (1972) algorithm, a revised version
of Scarf's (1973) algorithm, to calculate prices that satisfy these conditions
at each point in time. The algorithm can accommodate any number of sectors
and agents. Since this algorithm is not based on differential calculus, the
model can handle a number of large distortions and evaluate the effects of
simultaneous changes in any of them without linearity assumptions and without
ignoring income effects. This allows us to appraise tax policy changes which
are of sufficient magnitude to cause interactive effects throughout the economy.
We assume that there is no involuntary unemployment of factors. Markets
are perfectly competitive, with no externalities, quantity constraints, or
barriers to factor mobility.
For the benchmark sequence of equilibria, we assume that the economy
was on a balanced growth path in 1973. The first equilibrium in the sequence
replicates the 1973 data. Subsequent equilibria are merely scaled—up versions
of the initial equilibrium. Prices remain constant, and all quantities grow
at the same rate (the rate of growth of the effective labor force). We then
alter tax parameters and calculate a revised sequence of equilibria. Since
wecomputea complete set of prices and quantities under alternative tax
policies, we can estimate the changes in utility or income for each consumer
group, changes in national income, and all new factor allocations among industries.
Clearly, we cannot calculate an infinite sequence of equilibria.
Instead, we calculate equilibria a certain number of years into the future and
then calculate a termination term. The welfare evaluation in the termination
term will be precisely correct if the economy is on a steady—state growth path,21
as is the case in our base casesquence of equilibria. In a revised case
sequence, the tax change causes a transition towarda new steady—state
growth path. In this case, the termination
term calculations will only be
approximate, with the accuracy of the approximationbecoming better as the
economy settles more closely toward the newsteady—state growth path. In
our calculations of marginal excess
burden, the changes in relative prices
are small since the tax changes are small.
Therefore, a good approxjmatiojj
could be made by beginning thetermination term after 50 years orso. However,
our calculations of average excess burdeninvolve huge changes in relative
prices, so that the approach to the newsteady—state takes a very long time.
•In order to improve theaccuracy of the approximation in the terminationterm,
we carry our equilibrium calculations 100years into the future, by calculating
21 equilibria spaced fiveyears apart.22
IV. Resultsof Computations
A. Calculations ofMarginal Excess Burden
The main results ofour marginal excess burdencalculations are
shown in Tables 4 and 5.All of these resultsare based on sequences of
myopic expectations equi1ibrjIn the case of small
policy changes which
do not change relative
prices a great deal, thestructure of expectations
makes very little difference.The results presentedelsewhere in thispaper
involve maintaining thesame level of spending in thebase case and revised
sequences, but revenue yieldequality is not appropriate whenwe are interested
in the marginal welfare
cost of increasing the overallsize of the governmentS
Consequently, Tables 4 and 5contain the only set ofresults in this paper
which were obtained Without
requiring yield equality.Otherwise, we would be
unable to determine theamount of revenue which wouldbe caused by a marginal
change in tax rates.
We want to compare the
marginal deadweight loss with thenet change
in the amount ofresources which flow fromconsumers to the government and
thus taxes which the
government pays to itself arenetted out.
Table 4 shows themarginal excess burden fromraising all marginal
tax rates in the modelby one percent. As would beexpected, the marginal
excess burden is greater when
economic activities aremore elastic. Nevertheless,
the results are fairlyrobust over a reasonablerange of values for the key
consumer elasticities.
Our figures for themarginal welfare cost arequite substantial. They
indicate that the transfer of
an additional dollar to thegovernment auses
a deadweight loss of from 34to 48 extra cents. Thismeans that additional23
TABLE4




A. Saving elasticity =0.4,
48 Labor supply elasticity =0.15
B. Saving elasticity0.4,
36 Labor supply elasticity =0.0
C. Saving elasticity =0.0,
45C Labor supply elasticity =0.15
D. Saving elasticity =0.0,
34 Labor supply elasticity =0.0
aThese numbers and those in Table 6are based on a marginal increase in all
tax rates of one percent. We calculated sequences of 21 equilibria,spaced
five years apart (so that the horizon is 100 years). Transferpayemnts to
individuals were held constant.
TABLE 5
MARGINAl EXCESS BURDEN PER DOLLAR OF MARGINAL REVENUE
FOR MAJOR GROUPS OF TAX RATES




A. Capital Taxes at the Industry Level 49
B. Labor Taxes at the Industry Level 19C
C. All Consumer Sales Taxes 63
1. Taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and gasoline only$1.18
2. Taxes on goods other than alcohol, tobacco,
and gasoline 35C
D. Income Taxes 55C
E. Output Taxes
• 1. Government enterprises, subsidy rateunchanged4l
2. All 19 rates changed 34c24
public expenditures only ought to be undertaken if their marginal benefits
are at least 34 percent greater than the revenues raised. We should be
aware that the bucket marked "distortionary taxes," with which we carry
resources from the private sector to the public sector, is a leaky bucket
indeed.
In Table5, we break down the results of Table 4 by calculating the
marginal excess burden for the major tax rate subgroups, using a labor
supply elasticity of 0.15 and a saving elasticity of 0.4. These results
are not surprising, in view of the data on the level and dispersion of tax
rates in Table 3. The high and widely varying tax rates on capital and
consumer sales, and the progressive personal income tax rates lead to the
greatest losses. This suggests that the figure for the marginal excess burden
for the entire tax system could be reduced somewhat by a general equalization
of rates.
B. Calculations of Total and Average Welfare
Costs of Distortionary Taxes
For most of the simulations reported in this section, we remove all
taxes, and replace them by lump sum levies in proportion to personal income
taxes and sales taxes paid. These are the only two parts of the tax system
f or which the legal incidence (although not the economic incidence) can be
attributed to consumers directly. By assigning the lump sums in this manner,
we make a crude attempt to abstract from income effects (which can be important)
and concentrate on the efficiency aspects of the tax system.
In Table 6, we report the welfare gain from this tax change for the
same values of elasticity parameters which we used in Table 4. It seems to25
us that these welfare gains are very substantial, even for the case in
which both the uncompensated labor supply elasticity and the uncompensated
saving elasticity are zero. Even under these fairly inelastic assumptions,
the welfare gain from replacing the distortionary taxes exceeds one—eighth
of revenues.
In Table 7, we analyze the sensitivity of these results to assumptions
about expectations. The number of years of foresight is as defined in Section
II. Clearly, the expectational assumptions do not alter the basic magnitude
of our results. Since the future is discounted at a rate of four percent,
price changes in the distant future have little effect on consumer decisions.
Also, since prices change more rapidly at first and then approach a new
steady—state growth path, the consumer with T years of foresight is alerted
to more than half of the price change to which the consumer with 2T years of
foresight is alerted. For a much fuller discussion of this type of result,
see Ballard and Goulder (1982).
In the cas.e of the first simulation in Table 6, the present value
of the welfare gains is $3,111 billion in 1973 dollars. This is 9.14
percent of the total present value of population—corrected national income,
6.26 percent of the present value of expanded national income (including
the value of leisure), and 22.1 percent of revenues.
Of all the changes in behavior which contribute to this welfare
improvement, the most notable are those dealing with saving and the capital
stock. Saving is 80 percent higher in the initial equilibrium than it was
in the initial period of the base sequence. In addition, saving continues
at high levels: saving after 100 years of the revise sequence outstrips the
corresponding figure for the base sequence by 70 percent. The continued high26
TABLE 6
WELFARE GAINS FROM REPLACING EXISTING DISTORTIONARY TAXES
WITH LUMP SUM TAXES IN PROPORTION TO INCOME AND







Welfare Gain Percentage of
(in billions of Base Case
1973 doLLars) Revenues
0.4 0.15 $3,110.7 22.1%
0.4 0.0 2,497.8 17.7
0.0 0.15 2,236.1 15.9
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level of saving is the result of two offsetting forces.First, as capital
becomes more abundant, its relative price decreases. Sincewe have a
positive saving elasticity, this causes less saving, ceteris paribus.
However, the increased capital stock makes the economy wealthier. Given
our functional form assumption for the saving decision, this leads toan
increase in saving, ceteris paribus. In the 100years covered by this
sequence of equilibria, the capital/labor ratio increases by 31 percent.
As we said, this simulation involves large movements in relative
factor prices. The path for the price of capital relative to theprice
of labor is shown in Table 8, for the myopic simulation we have been
considering, and for the simulations with foresight. In the first equilibrium,
the price of capital relative to the price of labor rises from 1.0 inthe
base case to 2.129 in the revise case, under all formulations ofexpectations.
(Recall that prices are defined as net of taxes.) The change in the first
period is the same for all formulations of expectations because the extra
saving does not augment the capital stock until after the first equilibrium
is complete. Capital deepening then causes the price to fall,steeply at
first and less steeply later on as the economy approaches itsnew steady—
state growth path. When consumers have foresight, they recognize that the
price of capital will fall, so that saving becomes less attractive. They
save slightly less, and the price of capital falls less steeply.
From Table 8, it is clear that the economy has come fairly close to
its new steady—state growth path within 100 years. This time path ofcapital prices
implies that in the short run capital taxes are borne by capital, as suggested
by Harberger's (1962) incidence analysis of the corporate tax. In the longer
run, however, as Feldstein's (1974) work on variable factor supply indicates,
the burden of this tax is increasingly shifted to labor.1973 2.129 2.129 2;129
1978 1.932 1.948 1.954
1983 1.793 1.815 1.824
1988 1.689 1.714 1.725
1993 1.611 1.637 1.648
1998
0 1.551 1.575 1.587
2003 1.503 1.526 1.538
2008 1.466 1.437 1.498
2013 1.435 1.455 1.465
2018 1.411 1.429 1.438
2023 1.391 1,407 1.416
2028 1.375 1.389 1.397
2033 1.361 1.374 1.382
2038 1.350 1.362 1.368
2043 1.341 1.351 1.357
2048 1.333 1.343 1.348
2053 1.327 1.335 1.340
2058 1.322 1.329 1.334
2063 1.317 1.324 1.328
2068 1.314 1.320 1.323
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Year Expectations ofForesight ofForesight
aLabor supply elasticity =0.15;saving elasticity =0.4.
of capital was 1.0 in every period of base case sequence.29
Because of the capital deepening, it is not surprising that a large
proportion of the welfare gains occurs in the distant future. Even when
we carry out our calculations 100 years, we still find that 16 percent of
the welfare gains occur in the termination term. This raises the obvious
question of how sensitive these gains would be to changes in the discount
rate. In Table 9, we see that the removal of all distortionary taxes leads
to substantial welfare gains, even when a six percent real discount rate is
used. We do not report dollar figures in Table 9, since the present values
of both the base case sequence and the revise case sequence are affected by
the discounting.
TABLE 9
WELFARE GAIN FROM REPLACING THEEXISTINGTAXSYSTEM
WITH A LUMPSUM TAX:SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
WITH RESPECT TO THE DISCOUNT RATEa





aLabor supply elasticity =0.15;saving elasticity 0.4.
In the simulation in which all distortionary taxes are replaced by a
lump sum tax, labor supply increases in response to the removal of tax
distortions, but the increase is not nearly so large (relatively) as the
increase in saving. Of course, this flows directly from our assumptions about
factor supply elasticities. Labor supply in the revised sequence is higher
than in the base sequence by 18.5 percent in the first period and 15.7 percent30
in the final period. Consumption of goods rises instantaneously by eleven
percent. This is possible, despite the large increase in saving, because
of the increase in labor supply. In the final period of the revised sequence
(i.e., after 100 years), consumption is 33 percent higher than in the base
sequence. For most of the 15 consumer goods, the increase is near this 33
percent figure. However, we find large increases in the consumption of the
three consumer goods which were heavily taxed. Consumption of alcohol increases
by 133 percent, of tobacco by 141 percent, and of gasoline by 69 percent.
Finally, let us look at some of the changes in the industrial composition
of output which are broughtabout by the tax changes. In every period of the
base case sequence, the lightly taxed agriculture and real estate industries
account for 5.7 percent and 8.2 percent of total output, respectively. In the
first period of the revised sequence, these figures drop to 4.8 percent and
6.5 percent, respectively. On the other hand, the heavily taxed metals and
machinery industry increases from 12.6 percent to 14.2 percent, and trade
grows from 11.5 percent to 11.9 percent of total output. Over time, the
decrease in the relative price of capital leads the output proportions part
of the way back to their original positions.
In Table 10, we break down the results of Table 6 by calculating the
welfare gains associated with removing the major groups of distortionary taxes,
using a labor supply elasticity of 0.15 and a saving elasticity of 0.4. Thus,
Table 10 can be compared with Table 5, in the same way in which Table 6 could
be compared with Table 4.
Table 10 indicates that capital taxes at the industry level and income
taxes are the most important causes of distortion on average. This is not
surprising in view of the fact that growth of the capitat stock is important31
TABLE10
WELFAREGAINSFROi REPLACINGDIFFERENT PORTIONS
OFTHETAX SYSTEMWITH LTJ[PSUM TAXES
(inbillions of 1973 dollars,
Taxes Removed
A. All Distortionary Taxes
B. Capital Taxes at the Industry Level
C. Labor Taxes at the Industry Level
D. All Consumer Sales Taxes
1. Taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and
gasoline only
2. Taxes on other goods
E. Income Taxes
F. Output Taxes (18 industries only) 156.5 19.1
C. Output Taxes (all 19 industries)b 4435
H. Capital and Labor Taxes 1,745.2
I. Labor and Income Taxes 1,877.5
J. Capital and Sales Taxes l.74l.l
aAssuming saving elasticity =0.4;labor supply elasticity =0.15.
bee footnote 9regarding expressing the gain as a percentage of revenue
raised for this simulation.
for long term welfare improvements. Also, as seen in Table 3, these taxes
are the ones with the highest rates.
It is interesting to compare Table 10 with Table 5, and see that
the relationship between average loss and marginal loss is somewhat uneven.
However, marginal losses are always higher than average losses. The central
tendency is for marginal rats to be about twice as great as average rates,






















consider the second—best issue of how the welfare effects of different
taxes interact with each other. Rows H, I, and J of Table 10 show that,
more or less, 'additivity" is preserved. For example, the welfare gain
from removing capital taxes and labor taxes is nearly equal to the sum
of the gains from removing the two types of taxes in separate simulations.
Because lump sum levies are so unlikely ever to be adopted in
practice, it is interesting to ask whether a broadly based tax system, with
relatively undifferentiated rates, can give similarly large gains. If we
replace the existing system of distortionary taxes with a proportional income
tax, we get welfare gains of $1,851.3 billion in 1973 dollars. This is 13.2
percent of revenues and 60 percent of the gain from removing all taxes and
replacing them with lump sum levies. The tax rate which is necessary to raise
10
all of this revenue is around 42 percent. Broadly speaking, this experiment
yields behavior which is similar to that under the lump sum replacement. The
capital/labor ratio increases by more than 36 percent, not only because of a
large increase in saving, but also because of a small decrease in labor supply.
Another alternative for a broadly based tax is a progressive income
tax. To simulate such a plan, we keep the same progressive marginal rates
that we had in our base sequence, and scale each of them up by the same number
of percentage points until all of the required revenue is collected. This plan
makes the "equity—efficiency tradeoff" stand out in bold relief. There is still
a large welfare gain of $814.8 billion, but it is less than half as large as
the gain under a proportional income tax. The tax rates necessary to achieve
equal revenue yield range from around 18 percent for the lowest income consumer
to around 58 percent for the group with the highest incomes.33
A third broadly based tax is a value—added tax (VAT). Wesimulate
replacing the existing distortionary system with a VAT of the consumption
type.11 As with our other broadly—based alternative tax plans, the VAT
leads to substantial capital deepening. The relative price of capital rises
at first to 1.842, as a result of the lowering and equalization of capital
tax rates. The added incentives to save eventually lead to a 53 percent
increase in the capital/.labor ratio, as a result of which the relative price
of capital falls to about 1.04. The value—added tax rate necessary to replace
the existing system is in the range of 32 percent of gross sales.
The welfare gain resulting from the move to a VAT is $2,878.0 billion
in 1973 dollars, or about 20.4 percent of revenues. This is more than 90
percent of the gain which we reported for the lump sum tax. ThLs may seem
surprisingly high. The reason for this is that the income effects from the
lump sum simulation and the simulations of broadly based alternatives are
substantially different. In our model, the upper income groups have the
highest propensities to save. Consequently, highly progressive lump sum
schemes like the one we have used here will lead to less saving than less
progressive schemes.12 We therefore ran another simulation, in which the
existing tax system is replaced by a set of lump sum taxes allocated according
to income in the base case.13 The welfare gain associated with this type of
lump sum replacement is $3,721.2 billion, or 26.4 percent of revenues. In
Table 11, we summarize the results from these two lump sum simulations and
from the simulations using broadly based distortionary taxes.
In Section II, we suggested that not only the level but also the
dispersion of tax rates is important to the welfare cost of taxation. For
each major portion of the tax system, we would like to know how much welfare34
TABLE11
WELFARE GAINS FROM REPLACING THE EXISTING TAXSYSTEM

















ProportionalIncome tax 1,851.3 13.2
ProgressiveIncome tax 814.8 5.8
Consumption—type Value—added tax 2,878.0 20.4
loss is due to high taxes, and how much is due to taxes which discriminate
among industries, goods, or consumer groups. In the case of taxes on capital
at the industry level, this amounts to an analysis of intertemporal distortions
versus interindustry distortions.
We already have reported that replacing the taxes on capital at the
industry level leads to a welfare improvement of $1,311 billion. How much
of an improvement would we have if we equalized these rates at the average
level existing in the base case? Our estimate is approximately $448 billion,
or just over one—third of the total. While the distortions across sectors
are costly (they outweigh the costs of the distortions from all labor taxes
at the industry level), it is clearly the intertemporal distortion which has
the greatest effect. This contrasts with Harberger's (1964, p. 30) study,
from which he concludes:35
.the U.S. economy very likely suffers greater costs from
tax—induced misallocations of its given capital stock than from
the influence of taxation on the overall size of that capital
stock.
We believe that the reason for the difference is that the simple Harberger
framework could not be adapted easily to the study of the growth of the
economy over time.
Intersectoral distortions are relatively more important for consumer
purchase taxes. Equalization of consumer purchase tax rates leads to a
welfare gain of $266 billion, or more than 62 percent of the gain fromremoving
sales taxes entirely. Just the opposite is true of the taxes on labor at the
industry level. Equalization of these rates produces a negligible effect.
These results are not surprising in light of the data in Table 3. That table
showed that the coefficient of variation of labor taxes is minuscule, while
capital tax rates are moderately variable and consumer purchase tax rates are
highly variable.
Finally, we can ask what would happen if the rates were equalized
within every portion of the tax system (i.e., capital tax rates, income tax
rates, etc., are all set to their average values). In this case, we find
that the economy would enjoy a welfare gain of $1,295.8 billion, or more than
41 percent of the gain from replacing all distortionary taxes with lump sum
taxes in proportion to income and sales taxes paid. These results are
summarized in Table 12. The implication for tax policy is clear: large
welfare gains could accrue if we were to equalize tax rates.36
TABLE12
WELFARE GAINS FROM EQUALIZING TAX RATES




(in billionsof thisGroupof Taxes
Type of Tax Equalized 1973 dollars) withLumpSum Taxes
Capital Taxes at the Industry Level $447.7 34.2%
Consumer Sales Taxes 266.3 62.9
Income Taxes 601.0 34.9
Output Taxes 30.1 6.8
All Groups of Taxesa 1,295.8 41.7
a5 includes equalization of labor tax rates by industry, which are not
reported separately because the gains from equalization are negligible.37
V. Conclusion
Most of the earlier studies using this model have focused on
specific policy proposals, such as corporate tax integration or the
consumption tax. The present paper is designed to give more general
guidance to policy. The central message of this paper is that the welfare
losses caused by distortionary taxation can be very large. This is true
both on average and at the margin.
The marginal welfare loss to consumers from raising an additional
dollar of revenue is in the range of 34 cents to 48 cents. This has very
important implications for cost—benefit analysis. Samuelson (1954) developed
the condition for the optimal provision of a pure public good, namely, that
the sum of the marginal rates of substitution should equal the marginal
rate of transformation. However, this condition will only hold if the public
expenditure can be covered by lump sum taxes. If a public project must be
financed by distortionary taxes which cause deadweight loss, this excess
burden must be taken into account when we decide whether to undertake the
project. Our calculations indicate that the deadweight loss is between
one—third and one—half of revenues. This large wedge could cause us to
approve many fewer projects than we would approve if we were to use the simple
Samuelson condition.
The average deadweight loss per dollar of revenue is smaller than the
marginal deadweight loss, but it is still substantial. tJe estimate that the
gain from replacing the distortionary tax system with certain lump sum taxes
would be in the range of 13 cents to 22 cents per dollar. The gains would be
about 60 percent as great if the existing system were replaced with a
proportional income tax. Replacing the existing system with a consumption—type38
value—added tax would give even greater gains than those from switching
to a proportional income tax.
The greatest causes of inefficiency are the heavy taxation of
capital at the industry level., and of personal incomes. Each of these leads
to substantial intertemporal distortion. The intertemporal distortions appear
to be more important than intersectoral distortions, although the latter are
quite large. We should note, however, that these results were achieved with
data from 1973, when capital taxes were higher than they are now. The tax
changes passed in 1981 amounted to a substantial reduction in marginal taxes
on corporate capital. These changes will move us in the right direction (see
Fullerton and Henderson [1981}). Nevertheless, we believe that there is still
a good deal of room for improvement in the efficiency of the tax code. For
one thing, we find that equalizing the tax rates across sectors, goods, or
consumers for the various parts of the tax system would lead to gains with a
present value of almost $1.3 trillion, or about nine percent of revenue.
Our central conclusion is that considerations of economic efficiency
are very important to the evaluation of the tax system. These considerations
should be taken into account in two ways. First, we can design a tax system
which is more efficient. Secondly, regardless of what tax system we use, we
should consider its efficiency properties when we choose the level of public
expenditure.39
Footnotes
1. We will report our results in 1973 dollars, because our model is
specified with 1973 data.
2. The lump sum taxes in question were assigned in proportion to income
and sales taxes paid by the 12 consumer groups in our model. Different
methods of assigning the lump sums lead to different welfare gains.
In some cases, these were substantially greater..
3. In both our marginal and average calculations, we find that consumer
purchase taxes are highly distortionary. However, these results are
determined mainly by the very high taxes on alcohol, tobacco, and
gasoline. We urge caution in interpreting these results, for two reasons.
First, the taxes on alcohol and tobacco may be viewed as correcting
externalities, and the gasoline taxes may be viewed as benefit—related
charges. Second, we model consumer purchases with a Cobb—Douglas utility
function, which may overstate substantially the own—price elasticities
of demand for these goods.
4. Auerbach, Kotlikoff, and Skinner (1982) and Hausman (1981) also find that
progressive tax systems perform substantially less well than proportional
systems, in terms of overall welfare.
5. The manuipulations which follow can also be found in Browning (1976).
Both in this partial equilibrium analysis and in our later general
equilibrium calculations, we implicitly ignore certain issues raised by
Atkinson and Stern (1974). They analyze two cases under which the economy
might want to provide more public goods in the presence of distortionary
taxes than in the presence of lump sum taxes. The first is when there is
complementarity between public goods and taxed private goods. In our
model, we do not consider public production per Se. Secondly, Atkinson
and Stern consider the case of taxed goods which are inferior. However,
our utility functions restrict all goods to be normal.
6. Calculations based on equation (4) but which use tax rates as a proportion
of gross expenditure may understate the welfare loss from distortionary
taxation. This is one reason why Browning calculates marginal excess
burden figures which are lower than ours.
7.These are incomes as defined for the 1973 Consumer Expenditure Survey..
8. Our model exaggerates this effect, since we do not capture life cycle
differences among households.
9. A complication is caused by the fact that one of the output tax rates
is negative. We model the subsidies to government enterprises as a
negative tax on the output of that industry. One procedure would be to
multiply all rates by 1.01 except for the subsidy to government enterprises,
which we would multiply by 0.99. This would be an acceptable procedure40
for a simulation of marginal excess burden, but the results would
not be comparable with a calculation of the welfare gain from
setting all output tax rates to zero. To see this, consider the
extreme case in which the net revenue from the subsidy and the various
taxes is zero. Then, although the marginal excess burden might have
a reasonable value, the welfare gain per dollar of revenue from removing
the taxes and subsidy would be infinite. Thus, we report two results
for output taxes. In one case, we alter all 19 rates. In the other
case, we alter only the rates on outputs other than that of the government
enterprises industry.
10. This contrasts with some popular discussions of the 'flat tax,t in which
tax rates of around 20 percent are mentioned. The difference, of course,
is that the simulations reported here are concerned with replacing all
distortionary taxes, rather than only the Federal taxes.
11. We get the same results, regardless of whether we model an origin—based
or destination—based VAT. For an explanation of this equivalence, see
Goulder, Shoven, and Whalley (1982).
12. Because of this, and because we do not use an explicit life cycle model,
we do not emphasize the distributional results of these simulations.
13. Allocation according to income has been used in some of the earlier
papers using this model, e.g., Fullerton, et al., (1981),41
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